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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to determine under what circumstances foreign intervention
exacerbates sectarian conflict. Since the vast majority of academics do not pay heed to the
argument that sectarian conflict is simply the result of ancient hatreds, economic, political, and
social factors that result in sectarian conflict must be analyzed. To determine what these factors
are and how they interplay with intervention and its associated outcomes, this paper will first
review the appropriate literature on foreign intervention and sectarian conflict and then apply
relevant theories to three case studies in the Levant covering 1990 to 2014. This paper will
utilize the theory that sectarian conflict is produced when groups collectively fear for their future,
which eventually provokes a security dilemma and a conflict spiral. It logically follows that any
conditions that increase perceptions of fear or exacerbate the security dilemma or conflict spiral
are the circumstances under which foreign intervention exacerbates sectarian conflict. Ultimately
this paper concludes that high levels of poverty, preexisting civil conflict, the presence of a
marginalized sectarian group, and the presence of manipulative leaders in the context of an
intervention targeting a state’s government are the circumstances under which intervention
exacerbates sectarian conflict.
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Introduction
In the two decades prior to 2011, there were two US-led military interventions and one
UN-led sanctions regime targeting Iraq. However, since 2011, there have been at least 11
military and economic interventions in the region. The outcomes produced by the 2003 invasion
include the genesis of militant groups that still exist in the region today, a bloody sectarian civil
war, and ultimately a weak Iraqi state that today is unable and at times unwilling to police its
borders or protect its population from extremist groups. It remains to be seen if the numerous
interventions in the Levant in the last several years will produce similar outcomes. However, the
regionalization of the civil war in Syria, the rise of new extremist groups, and the return of
widespread sectarian violence to Iraq seems to indicate that similar outcomes are likely.
This paper will address the future of the Levant by analyzing how and why interventions
result in, fail to result in, or exacerbate ethnic conflict. More specifically, this paper will
determine the circumstances under which intervention in the Levant results in or increases
sectarian conflict1. Several such circumstances are determined by reviewing the academic
literature on intervention and sectarian conflict, and through an analysis of three Levantine case
studies. From the literature on intervention, I conclude structural factors such as the target of the
intervention and the effect of the intervention on state strength can make intervention more likely
to result in conflict. From the literature on sectarian and ethnic conflict, a general explanation
regarding the process that creates conflict between rival social groups is produced and several
economic and social factors that exacerbate this process are identified. These conclusions, as

1

Sectarian identity is a subset of religious identity which is itself a subset of ethnicity (e.g. Arab Christians and
Muslims are the same ethnicity, but hold different religious identities). Sunnis and Shias have largely the same
religious identity, but different sectarian identities. The terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘sectarian’ are used interchangeably in
this paper because both terms contextually distinguish between separate social groups.
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well as the utility of the theory on the genesis of sectarian conflict, are tested by analyzing to
what degree my chosen circumstances explain the outcomes produced in the case studies.
Ultimately I conclude that the theory on the creation of conflict between rival social
groups that I glean from the literature can fully explain the outcomes seen in the case studies.
This allows me to argue that interventions targeting state governments and interventions that
substantially decrease the target2 state’s capacity to provide services and security are the main
circumstances that cause intervention to result in sectarian conflict. Additionally, I argue that
poverty, preexisting civil conflict, the presence of politically relevant sectarian grievances, and
the presence of manipulative leaders who use sectarian identity and fear of the rival sect to
maintain power are lesser conditions that if extant in the target state, increase the likelihood of
sectarian conflict after an intervention by contributing to insecurity and marginalization.

Perspectives on Intervention
For the purposes of this paper, intervention is defined as the use of national armed forces,
coercive economic sanctions, and the transfer of weapons, money, or fighters to influence the
political, social or economic conditions in a target country. The inclusion of economic
components takes this definition beyond purely military intervention, and the inclusion of
transfers of weapons, money, or fighters as a form of intervention allows for atypical
interventions into irregular wars to be considered (Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). In this section I
will review the appropriate literature to illustrate the forms intervention can take, why
interventions take place, and general outcomes of intervention.
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‘Target state’ refers to the state that the intervention is directed at. ‘Sender state’ refers to the state that is
undertaking the intervention.
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Main Methods of Intervention
Interventions can be coded as either hostile interventions, supportive interventions, or
rival interventions. Hostile interventions oppose the target government while supportive
interventions do the opposite. Rival interventions refer to a situation where at least two actors are
intervening, with at least one supporting the target state’s government and at least one opposing
the target state’s government. Supportive interventions are statistically more likely to hasten the
end of a civil war, while hostile and rival interventions are more likely to prolong it (Pickering &
Kisangani, 2006). Interventions that are military or transmissive in nature can be either hostile or
supportive, whereas economic interventions are almost entirely hostile because it is generally not
feasible to sanction or economically attack non-state actors.
In the literature I found three main forms that interventions can take. The first is military
intervention, which is what the common usage of the term intervention describes. A hostile
military intervention by definition means going to war with the target state which is seen as a
very costly action. Supportive military intervention means involving national forces in a foreign
civil war, also a costly action. The 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo, which targeted the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, is an excellent example of a hostile military intervention. Despite high
economic and political costs, military intervention is the most effective and direct of the three
methods of intervention. In contrast to military intervention, economic sanctions are a less costly
way of intervening in the affairs of a target state, and do not rely violence to be effective.
Economic sanctions are a form of coercive intervention where a sender state attempts to
reduce the overall economic welfare of a target state in order to coerce the target state’s regime
to change its political behavior (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, 1990). The traditional rationale is that
despite a lower probability of success, sanctions are a viable policy tool because they are lower
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cost for the sender, they are less violent, and have lower human costs for the target than direct
military intervention. In theory, sanctions work by reducing the available resources in the
targeted state until the population is so deprived that they pressure their leaders to change their
behavior (Allen & Lektzian, 2013). The current economic sanctions targeting Iran in an attempt
to dissuade them from pursuing a nuclear program is a salient example of a hostile economic
intervention. However, sanctions are criticized because the act of lowering the aggregate level of
wealth and resources in a country disproportionately harms the poor and vulnerable, instead of
the elites who are typically responsible for the behavior that incurred the sanctions in the first
place. For example, the sanctions on Iran have harmed the average Iranian consumer and driven
up prices for basic goods. In an attempt to mitigate this effect, ‘smart sanctions’ or ‘targeted
sanctions’ are used to target only key industries and individuals. However, smart sanctions are
often criticized as functioning more as a signaling mechanism rather than a coercive policy
(Drezner, 2011).
The transfer of funds, weapons, and fighters is an atypical method of intervention which
can be either supportive or hostile. If the transfer is hostile, weapons and fighters unaffiliated
with the sender state’s government aid the rebels. Rebel forces often need financial resources
more than military support to initiate and persist in a conflict (Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). If
the transfer is supportive it is generally intended to prop up a weak government that is unable to
secure access to weapons, funding, and soldiers. It is important to note that transferring funds,
weapons, or fighters can be direct or permissive. For example, a direct transfer would be a sender
state’s government transferring funds directly to the government to support the target state
against rebels. In contrast, a permissive transfer in the same situation would be private actors,
ethnic allies, or special interests inside the sender state being permitted to transfer funds to their
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chosen side in the target state with the tacit consent of their host state. Permissive transfers are an
indication that greater distance from the conflict is preferred by the sender state. An example this
in practice is presented by the Second Congo War, where Rwanda armed and supplied several
rebel groups who fought against Rwanda’s enemy, the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Rwanda’s actions constitute a hostile transfer intervention.

Motivations for Intervention
Interventions are motivated primarily by three factors. First, there are instrumental factors
that include economic gains, domestic political concerns, military interest, and balance of power.
Second are affective factors which are identity-based and include communal grievances, and
shared senses of identity and ideology. Finally, there can be a normative motivation to intervene.
The international norm of responsibility to protect (R2P), which is upheld by liberalinternationalists, holds that intervention for humanitarian purposes is permissible in situations
where a state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens from imminent atrocities, genocide, or
ethnic cleansing (Williams, 2013). Ultimately the motive to intervene can be purely instrumental
in nature, or a mix of instrumental and affective. However, it is rarely purely affective because
states do not undertake costly interventions in situations where there are no real benefits outside
the realm of ideological solidarity (Carment, James, & Taydas, 2006; Friedman, Long, & Biddle,
2012). For example, while there were ideological and normative components to the 1999 Kosovo
intervention, the realist explanation that preserving the stability of Eastern Europe was the
principle motivation, carries more weight. However, states that are more secure, are able to
absorb higher costs, and have higher military and economic capacity have the ability to intervene
for more purely affective reasons (Walt, 1985). Ultimately, instrumental, affective, and
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normative factors determine when and where intervention takes place by informing decision
making processes that are made in a context largely dictated by realist logic.
It is important to note that the United States is able to partially largely transcend the
realist logic that dictates intervention decisions because of its hegemonic status. The United
States is considered a hegemon due to its geographic location, unparalleled military and
economic strength, and position of global leadership in international relations. As a hegemon, the
US has fewer barriers or disincentives to stop it from intervening abroad than any other country.
As a result, the US has undertaken military, economic, and transfer based interventions many
times since its rise to hegemonic status. Overthrowing leaders in South America, bombing
Kosovo and Somalia, and destroying centrifuges in Iran are all examples of this, to say nothing
of the three case studies discussed below where the US plays a considerable role.
The US’s propensity to intervene or invade sovereign states when it suits US interests is
considered by some to be a weakness in hegemonic stability theory. Hegemonic stability theory
holds that a unipolar system under a hegemon is stable configuration because the hegemon will
underwrite and uphold global security. However, since no other states can come close to
challenging the US, the hegemon does not need to be concerned with the balance of power. As a
result, there are fewer realist checks on the US to stop it from undertaking foolish wars or
interventions which can ultimately destabilize the international system, and cause or exacerbate
sectarian conflict (Buzan, 2013). Essentially, a hegemon can afford to intervene for affective and
normative reasons, and does not need to have vital interests informing the motivation to
intervene. Arguably, this leads to ill thought out foreign adventurism, such as the 2003 invasion
of Iraq, which has produced and exacerbated sectarian conflict in the Levant (Pape, 2009).
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Instrumental factors are best understood through realist theory, which is based on the
principal that international relations are inherently anarchical, and that the main goal of any state
is survival. Further, realism holds that states are unitary, rational actors. As a result of this, states
will decide to intervene when, after a careful consideration of instrumental factors, intervention
is considered the best strategy to achieve their interests. This is because instrumental factors,
such as how the decision to intervene, or not intervene, will affect the balance of power, are
exactly the variables that inform the realist calculus behind what is considered the best strategy
to achieve state interests. Supportive intervention can then be seen as a form of balancing
through alliance formation. Balancing through alliance formation refers to two states allying in
order to maintain a favorable balance of power relative to the allies’ adversaries. Realists believe
that balancing, and therefore supportive intervention, is a tactic that is used to protect values and
assets already possessed (Walt, 1985). States therefore have incentives to undertake a supportive
intervention if the fall of the target state would produce an unfavorable shift in the balance of
power for the sender state, or if the intervention would produce a favorable shift in the balance of
power for the sender state. For example, one of the reasons Iran is intervening in support of the
Syrian regime is because the fall of the regime would reduce Iran’s power relative to its regional
adversaries (Heydemann, 2013b).
Similarly, a hostile intervention is undertaken if the expected outcome produces a more
favorable balance of power for the sender state. However, hostile interventions cannot be seen as
realist alliance formation because they are essentially attacks on the target state. Instead, hostile
interventions occur either when there is the sender state believes there is a high potential for gain
at minimal cost3, or when the sender state perceives that the target state is a threat that cannot go
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For example, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait can be explained by this logic. Saddam perceived a high potential for
economic, and therefore balance of power gain at minimal cost by seizing Kuwait’s oil fields.
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unaddressed. Hostile interventions are therefore often informed by the realist balance of threat
theory, which holds that states will identify their greatest threats based on four instrumental
factors: 1) the aggregate power of the target, 2) the geographic proximity of the target, 3) the
offensive capacity of the target, 4) the perceived intentions of the target (Schweller, 1994). It is
unsurprising to realists then that neighboring states are often considered threatening, especially if
they are powerful, have offensive weapons, or an adversarial history. Historically, this describes
almost any pairing of Middle Eastern states outside of the Gulf Coast Monarchies. This situation
is exacerbated by the fact that many of the states in question are resource rich, creating
incentives to intervene for greed purposes. It is interesting to note that in contrast to supportive
interventions which are done to protect what is already possessed, hostile interventions can be
undertaken to gain new assets and values.
Affective factors that are rooted in identity are very salient in situations of sectarian
conflicts or civil wars. Ethnic kin in neighboring states are natural allies for both rebel and
regime forces, and are often the source of funds and fighters in the transfer method of
intervention. Additionally, ethnic allies in a neighboring state can pressure their government to
intervene more directly. Ideological solidarity can also motivate governments to intervene
because of the perception that protecting and affirming an ideology abroad protects and affirms it
at home (Walt, 1985) As a result, ethnic and sectarian linkages between a potential intervener
and rebels has been shown to result in a higher likelihood of intervention, but this does not hold
for ethnic linkages between a potential intervener and the target’s government (Carment, James,
& Taydas, 2006; Friedman, Long, & Biddle, 2012).
Normative motivation does not fit cleanly into either instrumental or affective factors. It
functions more as a combination of the two. On the instrumental side, invoking R2P is based
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partially on domestic political concerns of the sender state, and on the cooperation and collective
action of the international community who will be influenced by realist factors (Williams, 2013).
On the affective side, R2P is based on a global ideology of human rights and a global sense of
morality, grievance, and responsibility. In practice, R2P has been applied selectively and rarely,
an indication that R2P functions more as an affective factor than an instrumental one.

Outcomes of Intervention
The outcome produced by an intervention will be unique and a consequence of the
circumstances of the intervention. However, there are some generalized conclusions that can be
drawn about what types of outcomes are the most likely. The outcomes produced by military
intervention depend largely on whether the intervention is supportive or hostile. A supportive
intervention is more likely to end an extant civil war in the target state. In contrast a hostile
military intervention is more likely to prolong the conflict in question, and to increase the
intensity of the conflict (Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). In addition to this, state failure is a
possible result of a successful hostile intervention, and can lead to long lasting violence,
insurgencies, sectarian conflict, and humanitarian crisis (Flibbert, 2013). It is because of this that
I identify hostile interventions, and interventions that result in state weakness or failure as the
key circumstances under which intervention causes or exacerbates sectarian conflict.
There is considerable academic debate on the utility of sanctions as a coercive tool.
Ultimately the number of cases where sanctions alone can be shown to bring about a change in
behavior in the target state is disputed (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, 1990; Pape, 1997). However
sanctions generally succeed in their goal of reducing the aggregate welfare of the target state.
This often translates into increased poverty leading to food and health insecurity for the middle
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and lower class in the target state. Sanctions also often increase the civilian population’s
dependency on the target state’s government due to state run rationing programs, and can create
a ‘rally around the flag’ effect that increases nationalism (Allen & Lektzian, 2013). Finally, it is
common for military intervention to follow the imposition of sanctions. This often combines the
worst outcomes of both methods of intervention. Public health in the target state is drastically
reduced, state failure is more likely, and the economic damage from the sanctions is compounded
by the economic damage caused by violence.

Perspectives on Sectarianism and Conflict
To address the literature on sectarianism and conflict as it relates to the Levant it is
necessary to first understand the schism between Sunni and Shia Islam. Sunnis make up
approximately 85% of the 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, Shias make up the remaining 15%,
and a very small minority identify as members of subsects such as Alawites. Shias are a majority
in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain and have a plurality in Lebanon while Sunnis are the
majority in more than 40 states (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). The root of the schism
between the two sects is over the rightful leadership of Islam. Shias believe that the cousin of
Mohammed, Ali ibn Abi Talib and his descendants are part of a divine genealogy and should
lead the Islamic community while Sunnis reject succession based on Mohammed’s bloodline and
instead favor electing a caliph.
There has been a long history of Sunnis persecuting the Shia minority, which has resulted
in the reductionist and orientalist view that contemporary sectarian conflict is a result of ‘ancient
hatreds.’ The view that sectarian and ethnic conflicts are primordial in nature is supported by the
essentialist school of thought, which holds that loyalty to a communal identity is based on, and
reproduced by psychological needs and emotional factors. As a result, communities remember
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past grievances and conflicts, and ultimately attack traditional enemies due to old hatreds and
resentments (Kaufmann, 2005). However, most scholars view the ancient hatred argument as too
simplistic, and instead focus on political and economic factors to explain sectarian violence. For
example, in Sunni dominated states the Shia minority often lack access to economic
opportunities. Additionally, when a single sect controls the state that sect generally has almost
exclusive access to the state’s resource rents, further economically marginalizing the rival sect.
Both of these situations are exemplified by Iraq under Saddam’s rule. However, it is important to
not fully discount a history of conflict between the two sects as a factor that informs conflict
today. Negative sectarian sentiments are not created on the spot, instead they exist dormantly and
are informed by the histories, stories, and conflicting ideologies of the two sects, until sectarian
identity becomes politically relevant (Haddad, 2013; Lake & Rothchild, 1996). Despite these
factors, the fact remains that during the 1000 years prior to the turn of the millennium there were
only three instances of substantive sectarian conflict in the Levant (Haddad, 2013). This is strong
evidence that political, economic, and social factors must be analyzed to understand the causes of
sectarianism and conflict.
In analyzing these factors I found a common theme permeating theories of sectarian
conflict. There is a pathway to sectarian conflict, one that perhaps takes place in the context of
historic animosities, but is largely based on systematic factors that cause sectarian identity to
become an incredibly important part of everyday life (Kfir, 2014). This pathway can be broken
down into four distinct segments: fear, identification and mobilization, the security dilemma, and
the conflict spiral. It is important to note that this pathway can be nonlinear and self-reinforcing;
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multiple stages can occur at the same time and the stages from mobilization onwards can form a
positive feedback loop4 which fuels perceptions of fear (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007).

Perception of Fear for the Future
The pathway to sectarian conflict begins with the introduction of factors that cause
individuals and groups to fear for the future (Hshim, 2007; Lake & Rothchild, 1996). Fear for the
future can be generated in many different ways. The most direct way is a situation where
individuals come to fear for their physical safety and livelihoods. This is often the case in a
situation of “emerging anarchy” which describes a scenario where individuals and groups are
newly responsible for their own security (Carment, James, Taydas, 2009, 78). In a situation of
emerging anarchy, the state is unable or unwilling to provide for the security of certain
individuals and groups. Emerging anarchy is common in cases of failed, weak, or disrupted
states (Flibbert, 2013; Lake & Rothchild, 1996; Saikal, 2000).
Another factor that can increase perceptions of fear is the loss of public services. This is
also generally related to state weakness. Loss of services can increase perceptions of fear
because of the perception that the state is weakening, the perception that one is being
marginalized or discriminated against, or more benignly, the perception that the loss of the
service will decrease economic security (Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Prasch, 2012). Services whose
loss will increase perceptions of fear include security, property rights, contract enforcement,
social services, utilities such as electricity and water, and infrastructure maintenance (Di John,
2010).

4

A positive feedback loop is a feedback loop where a change to a system causes the change/the cause of the change
to be increased
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Fear for the future can also be generated by marginalization, which can be both political
and economic in nature. Political marginalization can mean disenfranchisement, loss of political
rights, lack of access to state institutions, no protection of minority rights, and the capture of the
state by a rival ethnic group (Ayub, 2013; Carment, James, & Taydas, 2009). This can lead
individuals and groups to foresee a future of greater marginalization with less security and
opportunity, thus increasing perceptions of fear.
Economic marginalization is the most salient under conditions of corruption and crony
capitalism (Prasch, 2012). Under these conditions, one sect or ethnic group exists in a privileged
position that is able to obtain the majority of a state’s economic gains, or when one group has
privileged access to the best jobs and opportunities in an economy. Similar to political
marginalization, this leads individuals and groups to predict a future of greater marginalization
with less security and opportunity. It is important to realize that in a situation where one sect
holds a privileged position, be it political, economic, or both, the potential or actual loss of that
privileged position will increase the privileged sect’s perception of fear as well. (Koubi &
Bohmelt, 2013; Murshed, 2010). This is because the loss of a privileged position entails not only
a reduction in opportunity, but also the potential for retribution.
The ultimate effect of increased perceptions of fear is increased incentives to construct a
sectarian identity, or to identify with a sectarian identity more strongly in order to obtain utility
and tangible benefits. This is supported by rational choice theory, which holds that individuals
make efforts to maximize their preferences in a rational way (Kaufman, 2005). The result is that
the self-interest of rational individuals leads to group identification so that the individuals can
access services and goods controlled by the group. It is important to note that the factors that
increase perceptions of fear for the future do not need to be sectarian in nature, or take place in a
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context of sectarian hostility because the end result of increasing sectarian identification is the
same. However, fears that are sectarian in nature or take place in the context of sectarian hostility
will be more acute, and will increase the speed and the scope of identification and mobilization.
This is supported by the essentialist framework, which holds that emotional responses drive
group formation, and that negative emotions regarding the ethnic or sectarian ‘other’ solidifies
in-groups, and incentivizes mobilization (Kaufman, 2005).

Identification and Mobilization
A common theme in the factors that increase perceptions of fear is the loss, or potential
future loss, of services and commodities. What is lost can be intangible in nature, political
enfranchisement or security for example, or a tangible service such as provision of a utility. Once
perception of fear grows enough, which is to say once enough is lost or endangered in aggregate,
individuals seek a way to recoup past losses and protect against future losses. This is
accomplished through increased affiliation and identification with a sectarian group and identity.
Group membership is achieved by displaying certain behaviors and social traits which actively
identify an individual as part of the group via social comparison (Fkir, 2014). Through sectarian
identification individuals gain real-world utility from their sectarian affiliation. Sectarian groups
provide services that increase the economic and physical security of their members. In essence,
social identification yields tangible benefits that mitigate perceptions of fear (Kfir, 2014;
Murshed, 2010).
The process by which services and benefits are actually provided to group members is
called mobilization. Sectarian groups are able to mobilize faster and more efficiently than most
other groups for several reasons. Sectarian groups can easily recruit from within their community,
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can easily overcome the collective action problem, and have established leaders and meeting
places. Additionally, sectarian groups can easily utilize built in symbols and ideals, have a shared
history and set of myths to invoke, and often have members from diverse social strata which
allows for a division of labor between financing and labor (Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013).
Constructivism is a useful theoretical lens for understanding this process. Constructivism
holds that group identity is constructed through iterated social discourse. Because of this, myths
involving past atrocities committed against the in-group are particularly important to group
formation and mobilization because they create a sense of communal identity while also
increasing perceptions of fear (Kaufman, 2005).
Provision of security is the clearest example of a communal group providing a good or
service, and is the most pertinent in a discussion on sectarian conflict. In a situation of emerging
anarchy, individuals who are newly responsible for their physical security will have rapidly
increasing perceptions of fear. The newly insecure then find their sectarian identity more salient
than ever before. This is doubly true if insecurity is caused by sectarian conflict because then
one’s sectarian identity makes them a target as well as providing them access to a protective
group (Kalyvas, & Kocher, 2007). To obtain security and services that the state can no longer (or
is unwilling to) provide, individuals turn to the most relevant social group they have access to,
which for the reasons given above will be groups mobilizing based on sectarian affiliation
(Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013). This same process can take place outside the context of a security risk
or emerging anarchy. Salient sectarian affiliation can be used to mitigate the loss of services,
utilities, or to balance against marginalization.
Increased perceptions of fear, identification, and mobilization can occur outside the
context of sectarian conflict and as a result of nonsectarian causes. Despite this, mobilization
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undertaken in these stages to increase security has the inherent ability to provoke a negative
sectarian response. As discussed earlier, this is partially due to a shared history that includes
marginalization and violence between the two sects which becomes relevant in lockstep with
identity becoming relevant in daily life (Haddad, 2013). However, a more important factor in
creating a negative sectarian response is the logic of the security dilemma which takes hold in
this situation.

The Security Dilemma
The security dilemma describes a situation where one state increases its military
capability in order to increase its security. This diminishes the security of other states if the
original state is unable to credibly signal that it does not have aggressive intentions, and all the
states exist in an anarchical environment with imperfect information and unresolvable
uncertainty. An arms race and a conflict spiral is the likely result. The security dilemma can be
applied to sectarian groups because the realist logic behind the security dilemma remains
constant. Just like states, sectarian groups can be seen as unitary, rational actors whose primary
goal and motivation is survival (Kaufman, 2005). As a result, the realist logic of the security
dilemma can be applied to sectarian groups in conditions of emerging anarchy. In essence when
one sectarian group seeks to increase its security by mobilizing and arming itself, other sectarian
groups perceive their security as reduced and will mobilize and arm themselves in turn (Flibbert,
2013).
Additionally, realism’s offense/defense theory informs this part of the pathway.
Offense/Defense theory holds that states, or in this case sectarian groups, have a preference
between offensive and defensive military tactics because of the advantages that either strategy
confers. In this context, an offensive strategy is seen as preferential because the first group to
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martially mobilize and begin committing offensive violent acts has a first mover advantage and
is almost impossible to defend against. As a result, not only does the security dilemma increase
perceptions of fear, it also incentivizes preemptive attacks. While the stages before the security
dilemma do not necessarily involve sectarian polarization and animosity to function, in the
security dilemma they are inevitable.
For example, in a situation of emerging anarchy or state disruption the presence of a Shia
militia in a nearby neighborhood incentivizes Sunnis to mobilize and militarize to ensure their
security. However, doing so increases perceptions of fear among nearby Shias who see their own
security as lessened. Even if the Shia militia was formed for nonsectarian reasons, it still
inflames sectarian tensions and provokes a sectarian response. If the Shia militia was formed for
sectarian reasons, the same process occurs but with greater intensity due to higher perceptions of
fear among Sunnis. The end result is less security for everyone and an increasing likelihood of
falling into a conflict spiral where actual violence reinforces and exacerbates the security
dilemma (Carment, James, Taydas, 2009). Ultimately, a feedback loop is formed to the first
stage on the pathway to sectarian conflict, perception of fear. Many scholars argue that sectarian
war is fundamentally built on the logic of the security dilemma which dictates balancing in terms
of mobilization in any situation where credibility cannot be established (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007;
Kaufman, 2005; Lake & Rothchild, 1996).

Conflict Spiral
Once sectarian mobilization has resulted in a security dilemma the scene is fully prepped
for sectarian conflict to begin. A conflict spiral describes the situation where once a violent act is
committed by one sect against another, the security dilemma becomes so exacerbated and
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grievances become so inflamed that a cycle of revenge attacks becomes inevitable (Hashim,
2007). In the conflict spiral, attacks by one sect against another fuel perceptions of fear and
ultimately come to drive the entire process by which fear is translated into actual violence. In
essence, extant sectarian violence is itself the cause of sectarian polarization and mobilization as
well as its consequence (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007).
In addition to increasing perceptions of fear, the conflict spiral also increases the scope
and speed of identification and mobilization. This is because religious and political violence
increases religiosity (Zussman, 2014). Because sectarian identity now turns individuals into
targets, those individuals now have a strong incentive to leverage that identity for protection by
their sect. This then leads to quicker and more martial mobilization for mutual protection which
in turn fuels the security dilemma. It is by this process that the pathway to sectarian conflict
becomes a positive feedback loop. This helps explain the growth of sectarian conflict ex post and
why sectarian conflicts are so difficult to end.
The initiation of conflict can turn a nonviolent sectarian cleavage into a dominant feature
of daily life. The result of this is that violence can cause further sectarian conflict that is
unrelated to the factors that precipitated the violence in the first place. Over time sectarian or
ethnic groups can find themselves involved in an ongoing conflict that is based far more off of
the animosity between the two groups than any original concrete objectives. (Kalyvas & Kocher,
2007). This phenomenon actually lends some weight to the essentialist ‘ancient hatreds’
argument because it seems possible for a sectarian or ethnic conflict that was originally political
in nature to morph into a primordial conflict based on hatred for the rival group (Kaufman, 2005).
Essentially, while sectarian conflicts are born from economic and political issues rather than
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identity politics, they are sustained and intensified by fear, identification, and conflict spirals
rooted in identity (Carment, James, & Taydas, 2009).

Exacerbating Factors
There are six main structural factors that influence the entire pathway from perceptions of
fear to the conflict spiral. These are poverty, state weakness, the presence of manipulative
leaders, the resource curse, neoliberal economic policies, and corruption. These factors increase
the general likelihood that the final stages of the pathway will be reached. While poverty is no
longer seen as the main determinant behind terrorism, it is still widely considered to increase the
likelihood of civil war and sectarian conflict. (Azam & Thelen, 2010; Carment, James, & Taydas,
2009; Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Murshed, 2010).
State weakness can, as discussed above, create conditions of emerging anarchy which
greatly increases the utility of sectarian identity and perceptions of fear. A weak state has a lower
capacity to suppress rebellions which increases the likelihood that a conflict will arise and fuel
perceptions of fear. Additionally, a poorly organized rebellion against a weak state is more likely
to leverage the cheapest mobilization network possible: ethnicity and sectarianism. Finally, while
a strong state has the ability to end a sectarian conflict inside its borders, or to win a sectarian
civil war, it also has the ability to forcefully limit the expression of sectarian identity and
negative sectarian sentiment (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007; Kaufman, 2005). The result is that
sectarian conflict almost inevitably takes place in a context of state weakness. The more
disrupted the state, the greater the risk of conflict, and the presence of a sectarian conflict
generally only makes the state weaker.
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Manipulative leaders, who are referred to in the literature as ‘ethnic entrepreneurs,’ can
exacerbate, or even cause sectarian conflict. Ethnic entrepreneurs are individuals who obtain, or
wish to obtain, public office or social power by appealing to a specific ethnic constituency, and
by playing on people’s fears of an ethic ‘other’ (Lake & Rothechild, 1996). The manipulative
power of ethnic entrepreneurs is supported by the constructivist perspective which argues that
since collective identities are constantly made and remade through social discourse, identities
can be easily coopted by manipulative leaders who control the discourse (Kaufman, 2005). The
result is that ethnic entrepreneurs legitimize ethnic violence, advocate for mobilization, and
exaggerate the risk and hostility of the other in order to build a constituency. In practice this
increases sectarian polarization, fuels the pathway to conflict by increasing perceptions of fear,
and can greatly exacerbate extant conflicts. Ethnic entrepreneurs are especially common in
contexts of state weakness where they are able to use ethnic mobilization, or violence, to cement
their power and delineate an in-group (Beswick, 2009). Iraq’s former Prime Minister, al-Maliki,
is an excellent example of an ethnic entrepreneur. By stoking fears of Sunni extremism he
appealed to Iraq’s Shia majority, and once in power he oversaw numerous policies that
disenfranchised, and legitimized violence against Sunnis. However, it is important to note that
ethnic entrepreneurs do not need to be state leaders or politicians, they can also operate on a
neighborhood level.
The resource curse and corruption are two exacerbating factors that create grievances in
society which are often experienced on sectarian lines (Brannigan, 2014; Prasch, 2012). The
resource curse describes a situation where revenue from natural resources is accompanied by
poverty and corruption, two factors which exacerbate sectarian polarization. Resource rents
allow political elites to enrich themselves through corruption. Income inequality is often further
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increased by crony capitalism, which reserves economic opportunities and privileges for state
elites. Under these conditions, it is common for economic gains to go primarily to one ethnic
group, especially if that group has captured the state to obtain resource rents (Lake & Rothchild,
1996; Prash, 2012). This all ultimately increases negative sectarian sentiment and creates a fertile
environment for the pathway to sectarian conflict by creating a feeling of communal injury
(Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Prash, 2012).
This entire situation can be further aggravated by neoliberal economic policies. Many
states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) pursued neoliberal policies in a bid to
capture greater foreign investment, and jumpstart their nascent private sectors which were
generally underdeveloped due to oil rents (Achcar, 2013). The failure of these neoliberal polices
can be partially blamed for the region’s poverty in recent years. 5 Neoliberal policies, which
prescribed lower rates of public investment, were supposed to lead to higher rates of private
investment by getting the state out of the market, and increased foreign investment by lowering
trade barriers. However, the private sector’s contributions did not offset the loss of public
investment funded by oil rents. Instead, gross capital formation stagnated between 1982 and
2007, the ratio of private investment to GDP remained one of the lowest in the world, foreign
direct investment never materialized, and unemployment boomed (Achcar, 2013, 44). A large
population of poor, unemployed young people is destabilizing because they are a pool of
potential recruits for terrorist or sectarian groups. Additionally, neoliberal polices exacerbate
corruption in weak states, and states without strong institutions by incentivizing and facilitating
patrimonialism and rent seeking behavior. Essentially, neoliberal economic polices both
exacerbated and caused poverty, while also facilitating corruption and bad governance (Achcar,

5

The poverty I am referring too, and the following statistics, exclude the Gulf Coast Countries which have arguably
benefited considerably from globalization and neoliberal policies.
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2013). Ultimately, since poverty and corruption are factors which can lead to and exacerbate
sectarian conflict, neoliberalism helps lead to and exacerbates sectarian conflict as well.

Conclusions on Sectarianism and Conflict
To address the question of under which circumstances intervention increase the
likelihood of sectarian conflict I will apply the results of intervention to the model of sectarian
conflict described above. Interventions that result in increased state weakness and higher
perceptions of fear, or more generally increase the utility of sectarian identity are the most likely
to exacerbate a sectarian security dilemma and create a conflict spiral. The circumstances that
allow for this that are identifiable from my literature review of sectarianism and conflict are
conditions of emerging anarchy, poverty, corruption, and sectarian grievances based on
economic and political marginalization. Ultimately, hostile interventions and the resulting state
weakness or failure, as well as sectarian grievances and marginalization, and the active presence
of ethnic entrepreneurs are identified as the circumstances under which intervention will cause or
exacerbate sectarian conflict.

Iraq in 1990: Hostile Economic and Military Interventions
While the case studies I present can be viewed as three discrete events, it is also
beneficial to view them as a single Levantine case study evolving over time with three periods in
that evolution being observed. The three periods correspond to three different sets of
interventions into the region and encompass hostile, supportive, and ultimately rival
interventions. This allows an analysis of how and why interventions in practice result in, fail to
result in, or exacerbate sectarian conflict. The first analyzed period is Iraq in the 1990s, when the
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state was targeted with hostile economic and military intervention. These interventions can be
seen as purely instrumental in nature. Western states viewed Iraq as an unfriendly regime, and
saw the invasion of Kuwait as a revisionist action that would reduce regional stability and energy
security. Arab states saw the invasion of Kuwait as an attempt to revise the regional balance of
power, and resisted the action by supporting the western led and UN sanctioned coalition.
During the 1970s, Iraq saw a huge increase in oil revenue. There was less than 1 billion
US dollars of oil revenue in 1970, but by 1980 this had increased to 26 billion dollars. This
money allowed for substantial development of the government bureaucracy, the development of
a strong social security net, the expansion of the military, financed infrastructure improvements
and paid for imports (Alnasrawi, 2001, 206). As a result of this, prior to the invasion of Kuwait,
Iraq was considered to be one of the most developed states in the Middle East (Ismael, 2007;
Talmadge, 2000).
However, economic stagnation accompanied expansive growth of Iraq’s military during
the 1980s. The percentage of the labor force in the military increased from 3% to 21% from 1975
to 1988 and the percentage of GDP spent on the military increased from 19% to almost two
thirds in the same period (Alnasrawi, 2001, 206). The increased military spending came at the
cost of improving living conditions, which coupled with an inability to substantially increase oil
rents incentivized Saddam’s regime to invade Kuwait on August 2nd, 1990. Saddam’s decision to
seize Kuwait’s oil fields conforms nicely to the realist theory that hostile intervention are
undertaken to gain new assets. The bid to seize Kuwait’s oil fields as a solution to Iraq’s
economic stagnation and to finance populist policies resulted in a comprehensive sanctions
regime being implemented by the UNSC on August 6th (Alnasrawi, 2001, 206).
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The sanctions regime cut Iraq off from the global economy, essentially ended Iraq’s oil
trade, froze financial assets, and involved a naval and air blockade. The result was a drastic
decrease in food security; Iraq had previously imported 70%-80% of its total food consumption.
The Iraqi government quickly instituted a rationing program, which as the intervention literature
suggests, resulted in greater state control over the population (Alnasrawi, 2001, 209; Talmadge,
2000). Additionally, the inability to obtain spare parts and repair supplies quickly began to
inhibit Iraq’s critical industries which were import reliant (Talmadge, 2000).
Economic intervention alone did not coerce Saddam to pull out of Kuwait, nor did it
result in increased sectarian conflict. The reason for this is despite the economic and human costs
of the sanction regime, Iraq still had a strong state. The Iraqi state kept negative sectarians
sentiments in check and mitigated perceptions of fear. Despite discriminatory policies which
favored Sunnis and Ba’ath party members, as well as cuts to social services, perceptions of fear
for the future were kept low by government rationing programs and the continued provision of
security and public goods (Alnasrawi, 2001).
Hostile military intervention against Iraq started on January 16th 1991 with a US led
bombing campaign that eviscerated Iraq’s military and quickly led to a full scale Iraqi retreat
from Kuwait. This event can also be seen as a supportive military intervention aiding Kuwait.
When framed as a supportive intervention, the decision to sanction and bomb Saddam’s forces
conforms nicely to the realist explanation that supportive interventions are undertaken to
preserve what is already possessed, in this case access to Kuwaiti oil and a favorable balance of
power in the region. However, coalition bombing inside Iraq was not limited to military targets,
which suggests that it is simplistic to view the military intervention as purely supportive of
Kuwait. Civilian targets including water treatment plants, power stations, telecom networks,
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industrial sites, oil facilities, and civilian buildings were also bombed (Alnasrawi, 2001).
Viewing the bombing as a hostile intervention with the goal of attacking Saddam’s regime also
conforms to the realist theory that hostile interventions are undertaken to gain something, in this
case the removal of Saddam.
As the literature suggests, economic intervention combined with military intervention
created a humanitarian crisis. Over 1.5 million Iraqi, including roughly six hundred thousand
children died from diseases related to unsafe water and inadequate nourishment which could not
be treated without imported medicines. Incidence of stunting and wasting also increased
dramatically in the following years (Ismael, 2007, 343). Unemployment increased dramatically,
hyperinflation was accompanied by rapidly increasing prices, and salaries fell dramatically.
Electricity output in Iraq fell to only 4% of the pre-bombing levels and oil production was
substantially reduced (Alnasrawi, 2001, 210; Ismael, 2007).
Despite a humanitarian crisis, a decimated economy and infrastructure, and continued
sanctions that precluded rebuilding, no substantial sectarian conflict emerged after the
interventions. It is reasonable to assume that perceptions of fear for the future increased due to
these outcomes but increased perceptions of fear did not translate into sectarian conflict. This is
because in addition to maintaining the ability to actively surprises ethnic violence, the Iraqi state
remained strong enough to continue providing services and guaranteeing security. The pathway
to sectarian conflict was interrupted between ‘increased perceptions of fear’ and ‘identification
and mobilization’ because there was little utility gained from increased sectarianism that the state
could not also provide. The result of this was that a sectarian security dilemma and subsequent
conflict spiral were never created.
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Evidence for this can be found in several places. First and foremost, Saddam’s regime
remained in power. This is a strong indication that while the Iraqi state was disrupted, and saw
its capacity reduced, it did not experience state failure. The food rationing program instituted
soon after the sanction regime, and later the UN’s Oil For Food program (OFFP) increased state
control over the population and provided channels for the state to deliver social services
(Alnasrawi, 2001; Talmadge, 2000). The continuance of Saddam’s regime ensured that a
situation of emerging anarchy was not created. Government food rationing ensured that the
population would not turn to sectarian mobilization to ensure their food security. The OFFP
provided revenue which the Iraqi government used to provide reduced but extant social services
and utilities to the population. This disincentivized sectarian identification and mobilization to
obtain the same services and utilities. While the first two interventions into Iraq did not result in
sectarian conflict, they created conditions which proved fertile for sectarian conflict after the
2003 military intervention thoroughly destroyed the Iraqi state.

Iraq in 2003: Hostile Military Intervention and Sectarian Civil War
The next period of intervention in the Levant is the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq. In
contrast to the 1990 interventions, the 2003 intervention was purely military in nature and caused
sectarian civil war. Ultimately, the factors that can be identified as contributing to this are forced
state failure and grievances due to marginalization experienced by both Shias and Sunnis which
together allowed the pathway to sectarian conflict to produce a security dilemma and conflict
spiral.
Viewed through a realist lens, this intervention was motivated by a high perception of
threat. Dick Chaney’s one-percent doctrine held that intervention was warranted in any situation
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where there was even a one-percent chance of terrorists gaining access to a WMD. The US had a
high perception of threat because the suspected presence of WMDs represented a high offensive
capacity, coupled with a perception of malignant intentions. That the likelihood of the threat
occurring could be so low and still warrant an invasion is evidence that a hegemon has fewer
barriers to stop them from intervening. Other realist justifications for the invasion of include the
desire to create a deeper military and political presence in the region, and the desire to influence
and protect the development and extraction of oil resources (Balaam & Dillman, 2011). It is
important to note that as realism predicts of hostile interventions, these conceptions of the
intervention end with the US gaining new assets.

State Failure in Iraq
Iraq experienced forced state failure for several reasons after the 2003 military
intervention. The invasion of Iraq destroyed what little public infrastructure survived the first
Gulf War and a decade of deprivation from sanctions. For instance, after the 2003 invasion, 80%
of Iraq’s higher education institutions were destroyed, only 15% of the population had at least 12
hours of electricity per day, and a third of the population lacked access to safe drinking water
(Ismael, 2000, 346). In addition to the physical damage, the 2003 military intervention resulted
in the destruction of two of the Iraqi institutions which could have potentially preserved law and
order.
The US-mandated process of de-Ba’athification purged the Iraqi government of many
former members of the Ba’ath party. This process was not limited to party elites: many mid and
low level bureaucrats were also removed. The result of the purges was massive Sunni
disenfranchisement, and the destruction of Iraq’s bureaucracy (Ayub, 2013; Kalyvas & Kocher,
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2007). The destruction of the bureaucracy undermined administrative capacity and created a
political vacuum which no actors were immediately able to fill. This contributed to the situation
of emerging anarchy because there was no legitimate authority to provide public goods (Flibbert,
2013). In addition to dismantling Iraq’s bureaucracy, the US administrative authority disbanded
Iraq’s military and other security apparatuses. Not only did this create a security vacuum, it
created a huge population of unemployed young men with military training, a grudge against the
United States, and potential sectarian grievances. The result was an additional contribution to
emerging anarchy (Bensahel, 2006; Flibbert, 2013).
This political and security vacuum was created in the context of the ongoing
humanitarian disaster created by the military and economic interventions of the first Gulf War. In
the 1990s, a strong Iraqi state kept the country from falling into chaos and sectarian conflict, but
that state strength no longer existed after 2003. The result was state failure. As the literature on
sectarianism and conflict would suggest, with the state no longer able to guarantee security or
other goods and services, a situation of emerging anarchy was created and the pathway to
sectarian conflict was put into motion. Immediate effects of state failure could be seen in the
rampant looting and violence that took place shortly after the fall of Baghdad. Ultimately it
would take several years for the situation in Iraq to descend into full scale civil war as
perceptions of fear, negative sectarian sentiment, and the security dilemma all became more
acute.

Sectarian Grievances in Iraq
In addition to the immediate personal and group security concerns created by the
situation of emerging anarchy, old and new grievances helped create negative sectarian
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sentiments which increased perceptions of fear and the utility of sectarian identity. Iraq’s Sunni
minority had enjoyed decades of privileged status under Saddam’s regime, and in the process
accumulated substantial ill will from the country’s Shias and Kurds. The process of deBa’athification created an inversion of the power relationship between the two sects; Shias now
controlled Iraq allowing for the marginalization of Sunnis. Nouri al-Malaki, Iraq’s president
from 2006 till 2014, exacerbated this situation by integrating Shia militias into the political body,
and by legitimizing the marginalization and violence committed against Sunnis (Hashim, 2007;
Khoury, 2013).
This situation of marginalization experienced on sectarian lines fits into the theory where
perceptions of fear are increased when a rival ethnic group captures the state (Ayub, 2013;
Carment, James, & Taydas, 2009). Additionally, the situation of mutual grievances experienced
on sectarian lines fits into the theory that group grievances lead to increased sectarian
identification and conflict (Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013). As the literature suggests to be a likely
outcome in this situation, Sunnis began mobilizing quickly after the 2003 military intervention in
attempts to regain lost power and privilege, and to protect themselves from Shia retribution
(Flibbert, 2013).

Application of Intervention and Sectarian Theory to Iraq
State failure, humanitarian crisis, and marginalization all resulted in increased
perceptions of fear, and increased utility from sectarian identification and mobilization. Both
Sunnis and Shias began mobilizing soon after the fall of Baghdad to provide for their own
security. One example of this is urban migration inside Baghdad. Roughly 80% of Baghdad’s
residents relocated from formerly multiethnic neighborhoods to the perceived safety of
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homogenous neighborhoods (Carpenter, 2012, 184). Ultimately, mobilization translated into
security dilemmas and conflict spirals as sectarian violence became more common in Iraq.
This process can be seen in the normalized presence of sectarian militias that operated out
of homogenous neighborhoods and regions. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Ja’ish Mahdi Army
(JAM) were, respectively, the main Sunni and Shia militias.6 However, smaller sectarian militias
were often organized at the neighborhood level and were seen (and often acted) as the last line of
defense for their local community (Carpenter, 2012; Hashim, 2007). While these militias were
the natural product of mobilized sectarian groups providing services for their constituents, their
very presence provoked a security dilemma. Essentially, the formation of any sectarian militia
decreased the perceived security and increased perceptions of fear for anyone in the rival sect
who the militia could potentially attack. This then incentivized the rival sect to create their own
militia, which of course resulted in increased perceptions of fear and lowered perceptions of
security for the original sect.
The movement along the pathway to sectarian conflict from the security dilemma to the
conflict spiral took place as sectarian violence became more prevalent. Both AQI and JAM
directly targeted the rival sect with tactics that included assassinating tribal leaders, government
officials, religious leaders, mass killings, and bombing civilian and religious targets (Carpenter,
2012; Hashim, 2007). This created an environment where sectarian identity played the dual role
of making individuals into targets as well as providing them with security and services through
sectarian identification. As theorized in the literature, this created a situation where sectarian

6

AQI and JAM are also considered terrorist groups. Terrorist groups carry out the same functions in the pathway to
sectarian conflict (e.g. increasing perceptions of fear and aggravating the security dilemma), but are considered by
some scholars as a separate category of actor from purely sectarian groups and militias because they replace
providing club goods and services to a broad sectarian constituency a broader political agenda. However, other
scholars argue that terrorist groups exist not to pursue a political agenda, but to provide club goods and services to
the in-group, and to create an environment of social solidarity (Abrahms, 2008)
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violence itself surmounted all the other factors that had previously increased perceptions of fear.
Sectarian violence came to be the cause and consequence of identification and mobilization
(Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). As a result the security dilemma was exacerbated past the breaking
point, and a cycle of revenge attacks on civilian populations as well as rival militias was started.
By February 2006, Iraq was in a state of sectarian civil war. In the following month
nearly 4000 Iraqis were killed in sectarian violence (Hashim, 2007, 3). There are two main
factors identified in the literature on intervention and sectarianism that can be identified in this
case study as contributing to sectarian civil war after the military intervention: state failure and
marginalization. State failure is recognized as increasing the likelihood of sectarian conflict, and
hostile interventions are understood as being the most likely to result in state failure (Pickering &
Kisangani, 2006; Saikal, 2000). As the literature suggests to be the likely outcome, the US led
hostile intervention resulted in state failure due in part to the subsequent dissolution of Iraq’s
army and bureaucracy, as well as the near total destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure.
The resource curse is also identified in the literature as a condition that increases the
likelihood of sectarian conflict by creating and inflaming grievances over economic and political
marginalization. Sectarian grievances themselves are also identified in the literature as a factor
that increases the likelihood of sectarian conflict (Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013). Prior to 2003, Iraq’s
Shia majority resented being ruled by a Sunni minority who disproportionately benefited from
oil rents, and who had access to political and economic opportunities that Shias did not. After the
2003 intervention, the relationship of privilege and grievance between Shias and Sunnis was
inverted and further exacerbated by de-Ba’athification and state legitimized marginalization and
violence under Maliki who can fairly be construed as a political entrepreneur. As predicted in the
literature, state failure resulted in a condition of emerging anarchy (Carment, James, & Taydas,
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2009). This was coupled with mutual and acute sectarian grievances which the literature suggests
served to keep historical animosities alive and kept sectarian identity politically relevant and
utilitarian (Haddad, 2013). Ultimately, both Iraqi case studies supports my argument that state
failure, sectarian grievances and marginalization, poverty, and the active presence of ethnic
entrepreneurs causes and exacerbates sectarian conflict.

Syria in 2011: Rival Interventions and Civil War
The final period of intervention in the Levant concerns the Syrian civil war between 2011
and early 2014. This period does not include recent developments such as US airstrikes in Syria
and Iraq which would rightly deserve their own section. Numerous state and non-state actors
have intervened in Syria on behalf of both the Assad regime and the rebels. As the literature
suggests, rival interventions resulted in a bloodier, protracted conflict (Pickering & Kisangani,
2006). To identify the conditions that caused interventions in Syria to result in sectarian conflict
this section will analyze the genesis of the Syrian civil war, the motivations and methods for both
the supportive and hostile interventions, and the outcomes these interventions produced.

Social, Political and Economic Causes of the Syrian Civil War
The progression from peaceful protests in Syria to a full blown sectarian civil war that is
spilling over Syria’s boarders requires an analysis of the social, political, and economic
conditions inside Syria prior to the initiation of the conflict. Analysis of these factors allows
some of the conditions under which intervention results in increased sectarian conflict to be
identified. High levels of poverty, marginalization and grievances, neoliberalism, oil rents and
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one sectarian group capturing the state were all extant conditions in Syria prior to 2011, and are
all identified in the literature as factors that make sectarian conflict more likely.
One of the most important social factors is the country’s diverse population. The majority
of Syria’s population is Sunni Muslim. However, the state is ruled by the minority Alawite sect
(an offshoot of Shia Islam) under the Assad regime. There are also numerous ethnic minorities
that include Shias, Kurds, Druze, Christians, Turkomen, and Ismailis. Syria borders Turkey,
Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and Iraq and as a result all of the larger religious groups have ethnic
allies in bordering states (Noueihed & Warren, 2013). Another pertinent social factor is that the
Assad regime historically and contemporarily portrays itself as a defender of the secular state and
minority rights.
An economic factor that helped lead Syria into civil war were the neoliberal reforms
undertaken by Bashar al-Assad after he replaced his father as the Syrian president in 2000. These
reforms were supposed to liberalize trade, expand the banking sector, increase foreign
investment, and reduce tariffs. However, they resulted in public investment falling from 13% of
GDP in 2005 to 8% of GDP in 2008, while private investment stagnated and the overall rate of
investment in the country fell from 25% of GDP to 20% of GDP (Achcar, 2013, 45). Despite this,
these neoliberal reforms created some economic gains which were captured almost entirely by
Assad’s closer allies. Meanwhile, the majority of Syrians experienced these reforms in terms of
rising unemployment and housing prices. Additionally, decreased tariffs left domestic
manufacturing unable to compete with foreign imports, creating further poverty and
unemployment (Hinnebusch, 2012; Noueihed & Warren, 2013).
Politically, Bashar al-Assad alienated many rural areas in the years leading up to the 2011
protests and civil war. Bashar’s father had invested heavily in rural areas, surrounded himself

34

with allies from the countryside, and enacted many popular subsidies. Bashar al-Assad lacked his
father’s connection to the countryside, ended many of the subsidies, removed many of the rural
old guard from power, and focused investment on urban centers. The result was a drop in
agriculture as a percentage of GDP and higher levels of poverty in rural areas. For example, an
average family in Damascus spent $773 per month in 2009 versus an average rural family which
only spent $439. The percentage of income spent on food by the urban family was 35%, while
the percentage spent but the rural family was 60% (Noueihed & Warren, 2013, 222).
The evolution from protests, to civil war, to regional sectarian conflict was rapid and took
place in an international context created by Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.
Assad was advised on how best to respond to civil unrest by a committee put together to analyze
the other Arab Spring revolutions. The committee found that the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes
fell because they failed to crush the protests instantly, and recommended a policy of violent
response to all protests (Heydemann, 2013a). Subsequently, in the rural town of Deraa several
young boys were arrested for vandalism and tortured by security forces. The resulting protests
were met with state sanctioned violence that killed several protestors. This in turn led to more
protests, and more protestor deaths which sparked a viscous cycle that spread rapidly in rural
areas and eventually reached urban centers. It is believed that protestors began arming
themselves and organizing for protection very early on in this process. Armed protestors were
soon complemented by defectors from the Syrian army who could not conscience killing their
countrymen, and who had little incentive to follow orders to kill their ethnic kin that came from
their minority leaders and officers. By early 2012, the situation in Syria had reached the point of
civil war (Hinnebusch, 2012; Nepstad, 2013; Noueihed & Warren, 2013).
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Motivations for Intervention in Syria
The motivations for states to undertake both supportive and hostile interventions in
Syria’s civil war are a mix of instrumental and affective in nature. On the instrumental side, the
outcome of Syria’s civil war will have a large effect on the regional balance of power. A rebel
victory would likely result in the emergence of a Sunni regime, while a victory by the Assad
regime will maintain the Alawite regime. This has important implications for the region, which is
currently divided into two competing camps. On one side are the Shia actors: Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and Hezbollah in Lebanon. They form an alliance that is fairly hostile to the west. In the other
camp, there are the Sunni states comprised of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states7 who are largely western aligned (Heydemann, 2013b; Ryan,
2012). In addition to this roughly bipolar configuration, Russia is a longtime ally of the Assad
regime and the United States is a longtime adversary.
The Sunni block would benefit greatly from the fall of the Assad regime, and thus has
incentive to intervene for instrumental reasons. This can be seen through the realist lens as the
desire to gain new assets, namely a more favorable balance of power, through hostile
intervention. This is the case because the emergence of a new Sunni state would weaken their
regional rival, Iran, and create political space for Turkey and the GCC states to expand their
influence. In addition to this, there was an affective component of the camp’s motivation to
support their sectarian allies who were targeted by the Assad regime throughout the conflict
(Khoury, 2013). While the relative importance of instrumental versus affective motivations can
only be speculated on, the literature indicates that instrumental reasons likely had greater
influence on policy makers.

7

The GCC states are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
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The Shia camp’s instrumental and affective motivations to intervene directly mirror those
of the Sunni camp. A regime victory in Syria would strength Iran’s position relative to Saudi
Arabia and Turkey, and maintain unbroken chain of bordering Shia states that links Iran to
Hezbollah in Lebanon by way of Iraq and Syria (Heydemann, 2013a). Seen through a realist lens,
this represents a supportive intervention as a form balancing against the Sunni block to preserve
a favorable balance of power created by a continuum of Shia states. Additionally, the Shia block
also experiences the same affective motivation to aid their sectarian allies.

Methods of Intervention in Syria
All three methods of intervention - military, economic, and passive and direct transfers have been employed by the actors intervening in Syria. Russia directly transfers money and
weapons to Syria (Saul, 2014). Iran also directly transfers money and weapons in support of the
Assad regime. In addition to transfers, Iran also has undertaken supportive military intervention
by sending members of the Basij militia, and military advisors to aid Assad (Saul & Hafezi,
2014). Hezbollah, as a non-state actor, does not cleanly fit into the literature on intervention.
Hezbollah fighters are active as combatants in Syria, which can either be seen as a permissive
transfer of fighters on behalf of Lebanon, or as a direct military intervention taken by a non-state
actor (Kershner, 2014; Wimmen, 2013).
On the hostile intervention side, the US has continually escalated the degree of
intervention it is willing to undertake in Syria. Initially, the US limited itself to economic
intervention via sanctions, later adding non-lethal aid to rebels, and even later running covert
programs to train rebel forces outside of Syria. Eventually, the US escalated its aid to transfers of
weapons to moderate rebel groups, although this is thought to be done through a third party,
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qualifying it as a permissive transfer (Bowman & Fordham, 2014). Turkey and the several GCC
states, which includes Saudi Arabia, transfer weapons and money both passively and directly to
rebel groups. In addition to this, they also allow fighters to migrate to Syria to fight the Assad
regime, although this is a purely passive transfer (Chivers & Schmitt, 2013).

Outcomes of Rival Interventions in Syria
The literature suggests that hostile interventions tend to result in longer and bloodier
conflicts, whereas supportive interventions result in shortened hostilities (Pickering & Kisangani,
2006). It logically follows that rival interventions that do not result in either the state or the
rebels taking a clear advantage would also result in a longer, bloodier conflict. This is exactly
what has happened in Syria. The numerous interventions prolonged the war by infusing money,
fighters, and weapons into a situation where neither the rebels nor the regime could win outright,
nor solidify an advantage that would force the other side to negotiate a conditional surrender.
The situation on the ground today is strong evidence that the outcome produced by the rival
interventions is intense and regionalized and sectarianized conflict. The literature of sectarianism
and conflict suggests that the outcome of increased sectarian conflict is due to a positive
feedback loop in the pathway to sectarian conflict. As discussed in the 2003 Iraq case study,
extant sectarian violence in the conflict spiral stage causes sectarian identity to turn individuals
into targets. This increases perceptions of fear, which causes sectarian conflict to become both
the cause and consequence of every other stage of the pathway.
Evidence for this positive feedback loop can be seen in Syria’s civil war which was
initially characterized as a conflict between the Assad regime and the Sunni majority and other
oppressed minority groups such as the Kurds (Totton, 2013). Over time, the conception that the
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war was between the rebels and the regime shifted to a conception of the war being defined in
sectarian terms, with the Assad regime representing only one of several sectarian enemies.
Evidence for this conceptual shift can be found in the now constant infighting between extremist
and more moderate rebel groups, as well as between rebel groups from different sects. Such
infighting has claimed roughly 3300 lives between the start of 2014 and late February (Barnard
& Saad, 2013; Holmes, 2014). This shift in conception is partially explained by the theory that in
the conflict spiral stage, rival groups can easily lose track of their original goals, and instead find
themselves enmeshed in a conflict based solely or mainly on animosity towards their rival
(Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007).

Under Which Circumstances Does Intervention Cause Sectarian Conflict
By applying the literature review to the case studies on intervention in Levant from 1990
to 2014, it is possible to determine several circumstances under which intervention will be more
likely to exacerbate (existing) sectarian conflict. First, as a precondition there must be multiple
sects or ethnicities inside the target state which explains why Afghanistan, a far more
homogenous state than Iraq or Syria, was largely spared sectarian conflict in the decade after it
experienced military intervention. With this precondition met, there are several circumstances
which I conclude make sectarian conflict more likely after an intervention. First, hostile
interventions and rival interventions result in or exacerbate sectarian conflict because they reduce
the state’s capacity to provide security and other services. Poverty is also a circumstance that
increases the likelihood of sectarian conflict, mainly by worsening perceptions of fear and
increasing the utility gained from sectarian affiliation. Inequality and marginalization that are
experienced along sectarian lines are other conditions that result in an increased likelihood of
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sectarian conflict because salient sectarian grievances and negative sectarian sentiments are
created. Finally, the presence of ethnic entrepreneurs is a circumstance under which intervention
makes sectarian conflict more likely because the entrepreneurs will have an ideal environment to
stoke perceptions of fear to garner political support.
The literature argues and the case studies support the claim that hostile interventions,
such as the ones targeting Iraq, are more likely to result in sectarian conflict. Rival interventions
where neither the hostile nor the supportive camp can produce a significant advantage in the
target state, such as the rival interventions in the Syrian case study, are likely to result in
sectarian conflict by the same logic. This is essentially because hostile interventions result in a
greater degree of state disruption. The more disrupted a state is, the more likely a situation of
emerging anarchy will occur. As discussed above, emerging anarchy is a primary factor that
increases perceptions of fear which fuels the pathway to sectarian conflict as a whole (Saikal,
2000). The case study of Iraq post 2003 shows that hostile interventions that cause a great
enough degree of state disruption create situations of emerging anarchy; the creation of political
and security vacuums in Iraq are examples of this. Based on the ability of hostile interventions to
drastically increase perceptions of fear, I conclude that hostile interventions (undertaken by the
intervening state) are a primary exacerbating factor of sectarian conflict.
Poverty is strongly associated in the literature with a higher likelihood of conflict
(Carment, James & Taydas, 2009; Carpenter, 2012; Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Murshed, 2010;
Prasch, 2012). It is fairly intuitive that higher levels of poverty increases the likelihood of
sectarian conflict; perceptions of fear for the future will be stronger among impoverished
populations who will feel any economic shocks caused by an intervention more acutely. An
impoverished state is weaker, which facilitates the emergence of anarchy. Finally, impoverished
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individuals also gain more utility from sectarian identification because the poor have fewer
alternatives other than sectarian mobilization to obtain services. Based on this, I believe poverty
in the target state to be a circumstance under which intervention is more likely to produce
sectarian conflict.
Another fairly intuitive circumstance that increases the likelihood of sectarian conflict is
the presence of an extant violent conflict in a state that is the target of a hostile or rival
intervention. Not only would the conflict result in degree of state disruption, in this circumstance
the pathway to sectarian conflict would already be in motion because of increased perceptions of
fear due to the conflict. This describes the situation in Syria prior to the rival interventions.
Additionally, if the civil war in question is sectarian in nature it is already possible for a conflict
spiral and positive feedback loop to have been created. Alternatively, even if the conflict in
question is nonsectarian in nature, increased perceptions of fear would still incentivize sectarian
identification and mobilization, thus keeping the potential for future sectarian conflict alive.
Based on the inflammatory effect a preexisting conflict would have on the pathway to sectarian
conflict, I believe that an extant civil conflict in the target state is a circumstance under which
intervention is more likely to produce sectarian conflict.
A situation where one sect is politically or economically marginalized by a rival sect in
the target state is another circumstance under which intervention will be more likely to cause or
exacerbate sectarian conflict. Sectarian conflict is more likely under this condition because
marginalization increases perceptions of fear for the future in the marginalized group and creates
politically salient sectarian grievances. Marginalization leads to increased perceptions of fear
when the marginalized group foresees a future of even greater marginalization and decreased
opportunity and security. This was experienced by Shias under Saddam’s rule, and by Sunnis
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under Maliki’s. Salient grievances exacerbate the pathway to sectarian conflict by producing
negative sentiments regarding the rival sect and a strengthened sense of affinity for one’s own
sect. These two outcomes fuel the pathway to sectarian conflict by increasing the speed and
scope of the identification and mobilization stage, add increased aggravation to the security
dilemma stage, and ultimately can cause more intense conflict in the conflict spiral stage. To
expand the Iraqi example, 2014 has seen numerous retributive attacks against both sects for
grievances built up under both Saddam’s and Maliki’s rule. Based on the effects of both
increased perceptions of fear and grievances, I conclude that the presence of a marginalized
sectarian group in the target state is a circumstance under which intervention makes sectarian
conflict more likely.
The final circumstance that I identify as increasing the likelihood of sectarian conflict
after intervention is the presence of ethnic entrepreneurs. These are individuals who purposely
exacerbate perceptions of fear, of sectarian rivals in particular, in order to build a political or
social constituency. Ethnic entrepreneurs often legitimize and direct sectarian violence,
contributing to the conflict spiral stage and helping create positive feedback loops inside the
pathway. Ethnic entrepreneurs are particularly dangerous and influential after an intervention
because they can prey on naturally heightened perceptions of fear and make use of the increased
relevance of sectarian identity. Bashar al-Assad for example, has acted as an ethnic entrepreneur
since 2011 by maintaining the loyalty of many of Syria’s minority groups with rhetoric
predicting their marginalization and slaughter under a non-secular Sunni regime. Assad has used
this rhetoric to convince minority groups to fight against rebel forces thus legitimizing and
directing sectarian violence by controlling perceptions of fear (Noueihed & Warren, 2013).
However, ethnic entrepreneurs do not need to be state leaders; they can exacerbate sectarian
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relations at any level of society. Based on the ability of ethnic entrepreneurs to increase
perceptions of fear and stoke violence I conclude that their presence in the target state is a
circumstance under which intervention makes sectarian conflict more likely.

Conclusion
Interventions that result in state failure or to a lesser degree state weakness are the most
likely to result in sectarian conflict. The most important factor that contributes to this is the type
of intervention: hostile interventions and balanced rival interventions are the most likely to cause
substantial state disruption according to the literature and as evidenced in the case studies. The
other factors identified in the literature and seen in the Levant that influence the degree of state
disruption are the presence of: poverty, preexisting conflict, a marginalized sectarian group, and
ethnic entrepreneurs in the target state. Ultimately, all of these circumstances function in the
same way. They increase the speed and scope of the pathway to sectarian conflict by increasing
perceptions of fear, incentivizing sectarian identification and mobilization, exacerbating the
security dilemma, or fueling the conflict spiral and creating positive feedback loops to other
stages in the pathway.
The three Levantine case studies provide strong evidence for this argument. The two
interventions into Iraq in the 90s did not result in sectarian conflict, despite increasing
perceptions of fear by causing a humanitarian crisis and destroying most of Iraq’s infrastructure.
The reason for this is that the Iraqi state under Saddam’s regime was not weakened enough for
the pathway to sectarian conflict to reach the identification and mobilization stage because there
was little utility to be derived from sectarian affiliation that the state did not also provide. The
third intervention targeting Iraq caused state failure and put the pathway into motion,

43

culminating in a sectarian civil war. The lesser circumstances of poverty, grievances caused by
marginalization, and the operation of ethnic entrepreneurs can all also be seen as contributing to
Iraq’s sectarian conflict.
The Syrian case study also provides evidence that rival interventions resulting in state
weakness and the lesser circumstances of manipulative leaders, powerful sectarian grievances,
poverty, and a preexisting conflict all provide fuel for the pathway to sectarian conflict. However,
the civil war in Syria has lasted longer and has claimed more lives than the civil war in Iraq.
Determining why this is the case would be a valuable topic of further study.
Another topic for further study is the emergence of the insurgent group Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It is worth noting that an analysis of ISIL and their activities since
2011 provides ample evidence that intervention that weakens states and creates grievances will
result in increased sectarian conflict. Applying the pathway to sectarian conflict theory to the
atrocities that ISIL has committed yields concerning results. Mass killings and ethnic cleansing
committed by a Sunni group with high military capacity will result in massively increased
perceptions of fear among Shi’ites and other minorities in the region. Ultimately, it is
unsurprising that Shia and Kurdish militias are mobilizing in response, or that they have carried
out revenge attacks against Sunni civilians (Hubbard, 2014). The only silver lining regarding
ISIL and the situation in the region today is that the current US led military intervention is, for
the first time, a supportive intervention in the Levant.
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